SOME People are subject to a certain delicacy of passion, which makes
them extremely sensible to all the accidents of life, and gives them a lively
joy upon every prosperous event, as well as a piercing grief, when they meet
with misfortunes and adversity. Favours and good offices easily engage their
friendship; while the smallest injury provokes their resentment. Any honour or
mark of distinction elevates them above measure; but they are as sensibly
touched with contempt. People of this character have, no doubt, more lively
enjoyments, as well as more pungent° sorrows, than men of cool and sedate
tempers: But, I believe, when every thing is balanced, there is no one, who
would not rather be of the latter character, were he entirely master of his own
disposition. Good or ill fortune is very little at our disposal: And when a
person, that has this sensibility of temper, meets with any misfortune, his
sorrow or resentment takes entire possession of him, and deprives him of all
relish in the common occurrences of life; the right enjoyment of which forms
the chief part of our happiness. Great pleasures are much less frequent than
great pains; so that a sensible temper must meet with fewer trials in the
former way than in the latter. Not to mention, that men of such lively passions
are apt to be transported beyond all bounds of prudence and discretion, and to
take false steps in the conduct of life, which are often irretrievable.
There is a delicacy of taste observable in some men, which very much
resembles this delicacy of passion, and produces the same sensibility to beauty
and deformity of every kind, as that does to prosperity and adversity,
obligations and injuries. When you present a poem or a picture to a man
possessed of this talent, the delicacy of his feeling makes him be sensibly
touched with every part of it; nor are the masterly strokes perceived with more
exquisite relish and satisfaction, than the negligences or absurdities with
disgust and uneasiness. A polite and judicious conversation affords him the
highest entertainment; rudeness or impertinence is as great a punishment to
him. In short, delicacy of taste has the same effect as delicacy of passion: It
enlarges the sphere both of our happiness and misery, and makes us sensible to
pains as well as pleasures, which escape the rest of mankind.
I believe, however, every one will agree with me, that, notwithstanding
this resemblance, delicacy of taste is as much to be desired and cultivated as
delicacy of passion is to be lamented, and to be remedied, if possible. The
good or ill accidents of life are very little at our disposal; but we are
pretty much masters what books we shall read, what diversions we shall partake
of, and what company we shall keep. Philosophers have endeavoured to render
happiness entirely independent of every thing external. That degree of
perfection is impossible to be attained: But every wise man will endeavour to
place his happiness on such objects chiefly as depend upon himself: and that is
not to be attained so much by any other means as by this delicacy of sentiment.
When a man is possessed of that talent, he is more happy by what pleases his
taste, than by what gratifies his appetites, and receives more enjoyment from a
poem or a piece of reasoning than the most expensive luxury can afford.
Whatever connection there may be originally between these two species of
delicacy, I am persuaded, that nothing is so proper to cure us of this delicacy
of passion, as the cultivating of that higher and more refined taste, which
enables us to judge of the characters of men, of compositions of genius, and of
the productions of the nobler arts. A greater or less relish for those obvious
beauties, which strike the senses, depends entirely upon the greater or less
sensibility of the temper: But with regard to the sciences and liberal arts, a
fine taste is, in some measure, the same with strong sense, or at least depends
so much upon it, that they are inseparable. In order to judge aright of a
composition of genius, there are so many views to be taken in, so many
circumstances to be compared, and such a knowledge of human nature requisite,
that no man, who is not possessed of the soundest judgment, will ever make a
tolerable critic in such performances. And this is a new reason for cultivating
a relish° in the liberal arts. Our judgment will strengthen by this exercise:
We shall form juster notions of life: Many things, which please or afflict
others, will appear to us too frivolous to engage our attention: And we shall lose
by degrees that sensibility and delicacy of passion, which is so incommodious.
But perhaps I have gone too far in saying, that a cultivated taste for
the polite arts extinguishes the passions, and renders us indifferent to those
objects, which are so fondly pursued by the rest of mankind. On farther
reflection, I find, that it rather improves our sensibility for all the tender
and agreeable passions; at the same time that it renders the mind incapable of
the rougher and more boisterous emotions.
Ingenuas
didicisse fideliter artes,
Emollit mores,
nec sinit esse feros.
["A faithful study of the liberal arts humanizes
character and permits it not to be cruel"]
For this, I think there may be assigned two very natural reasons. In the
first place, nothing is so improving
to the temper as the study of the beauties, either of poetry, eloquence, music,
or painting. They give a certain elegance of sentiment to which the rest of
mankind are strangers. The emotions which they excite are soft and tender. They
draw off the mind from the hurry of business and interest; cherish reflection;
dispose to tranquillity; and produce an agreeable melancholy, which, of all
dispositions of the mind, is the best suited to love and friendship.
In the second place, a
delicacy of taste is favourable to love and friendship, by confining our choice
to few people, and making us indifferent to the company and conversation of the
greater part of men. You will seldom find, that mere men of the world, whatever
strong sense they may be endowed with, are very nice in distinguishing
characters, or in marking those insensible differences and gradations, which
make one man preferable to another. Any one, that has competent sense, is
sufficient for their entertainment: They talk to him, of their pleasure and
affairs, with the same frankness that they would to another; and finding many,
who are fit to supply his place, they never feel any vacancy or want° in his
absence. But to make use of the allusion of a celebrated French author, the
judgment[1]
may be compared to a clock or watch, where the most ordinary machine is
sufficient to tell the hours; but the most elaborate alone can point out the
minutes and seconds, and distinguish the smallest differences of time. One that
has well digested his knowledge both of books and men, has little enjoyment but
in the company of a few select companions. He feels too sensibly, how much all
the rest of mankind fall short of the notions which he has entertained. And,
his affections being thus confined within a narrow circle, no wonder he carries
them further, than if they were more general and undistinguished. The gaiety and
frolic of a bottle companion improves with him into a solid friendship: And the
ardours of a youthful appetite become an elegant passion.
Hume, Essays, Moral, Political, and
Literary, Part I, Essay I Of the delicacy of taste and passion (1742).
Aucun commentaire:
Enregistrer un commentaire